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ONCE MORE UNTO THE BREACH: AMERICAN WAR POWER
AND A SECOND LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPT TO ENSURE
CONGRESSIONAL INPUT
Jonathan T. Menitove*
Once again embroiled in an unpopular overseas armed conflict, the United States
faces difficult questions concerning the constitutional use of military force. Records
from the Constitutional Convention suggest the Framers intended to lodge Amer-
ica's power to go to war with the Congress. While American presidents' early use of
military force displays deference to the legislature, more recent military actions il-
lustrate the executive's dominance in making war. Notwithstanding a few early
court decisions in Congress 's favor, the judiciary has been unhelpful in restoring
the constitutional Framers' vision for the administration of the war power Con-
gress, therefore, has been forced to act alone in attempting to revive the legislature's
role in the decision to go to war After several unsuccessful attempts, Congress's
passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 appeared to finally re-inject con-
gressional input in the war-making process. However subsequent jurisprudence,
scholarly debate, and presidential disregard for the law have revealed the War
Powers Resolution's various inadequacies. Accordingly, this paper proposes that a
new law-the War Powers Appropriations Act-be passed to protect the congres-
sional war powers afforded by the Constitution. By protecting Congress's role via
the legislature's constitutional power to appropriate funds, the War Powers Appro-
priations Act represents a solution that accomplishes the goal of forcing the
executive to consult with Congress, while avoiding the potential pitfalls of uncon-
stitutionality, inartful drafting, and presidential disregard.
INTRODUCTION
Observers of today's military efforts in Iraq might be experiencing
a certain d6jAi vu reminiscent of the early 197 0s and the American
involvement in Vietnam. While the Vietnam War was unquestionably
on a larger scale-both in terms of American casualties as well as the
war's polarization of the American public-several parallels can be
drawn. Both the Vietnam War and the current war in Iraq were ini-
tially met with overwhelming support and were authorized by the
United States Congress,1 both wars have suffered a steadily decreasing
* Harvard Law School, J.D. expected 2010; Yale University, M.A. 2007, B.A. 2007. I
would like to thank Andrew L. Kaufman and David R. Mayhew for their support, guidance,
and helpful comments.
1. Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security
in Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin Resolution), Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964);Joint
Resolution to Authorize the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116
Stat. 1498 (2002).
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degree of public support,2 and both wars have tarnished the legacy
of a departing American president.3 Additionally, as Congress sought
to obtain a greater role in each war's prosecution, both the Vietnam
War and the current War in Iraq serve to highlight moments of
constitutional awareness, whereby the balance of war power between
Congress and the president has come under scrutiny.
Ever since the end of the American involvement in Vietnam,
politicians, scholars, and commentators have continually debated
war power issues, pitting the Constitution's delegation of the war
power to Congress against the historical practice of presidents us-
ing force without congressional authorization.4 As the American
involvement in Vietnam drew to a close, Congress sought to ad-
dress this issue with the passage of the War Powers Resolution of
1973,5 a bill that once sought to protect Congress's role in war-
making but has subsequently been discredited both by allegations
that the Resolution is unconstitutional and that it is inartfully
drafted, as well as by the fact that American presidents have consis-
tently ignored the Resolution's provisions. Now, as American
involvement in Iraq begins to conclude, the issue of war power re-
form has once again become politically salient, and the National
War Powers Commission assembled at the University of Virginia
has already suggested potential legislation.7 This Note seeks to con-
tribute to the discussion concerning what legislation is necessary to
restore balance between the legislative and executive branches
when the United States wages war. It proposes that a new law-the
War Powers Appropriations Act-be passed to protect the congres-
2. See, e.g., Editorial, L.B.J. and 1968, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1968, at El6; David Leon-
hardt & Marjorie Connelly, 81% in Poll Say Nation is Headed on Wrong Track, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
4, 2008, at Al.
3. See, e.g., Max Frankel, Why the Gap Between L.B.J and the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1968, at SM26; Editorial, Mission Still Not Accomplished, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at A26.
4. Comment, Congressional Control of Presidential War-Making Under the War Powers Act:
The Status of a Legislative Veto After Chadha, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1217, 1217 (1984) ("Since the
final years of the Vietnam War, politicians and commentators have sought to reconcile the
constitutional delegation of war powers to Congress with the historical practice of presiden-
tial deployment of military forces in foreign conflicts without congressional approval.").
5. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
6. The National War Powers Commission assembled at the University of Virginia
includes some of America's foremost foreign policy experts including Slade Gorton, Lee
H. Hamilton, Carla A. Hills, John 0. Marsh, Jr., Edwin Meese, III, Abner J. Mikva, J. Paul
Reason, Brent Scowcroft, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Strobe Talbott, John C. Jeffries, Jr., and
W. Taylor Reveley, III. See National War Powers Commission Recommends War Powers Consultation
Act of 2009, UVA TODAY, July 8, 2008, http://www.virginia.edu/uvatoday/
newsRelease.php?id=5680 (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
7. JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION REPORT (2008)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://millercenter.org/policy/commissions/warpowers/report.
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sional war powers through a restructuring of the defense appro-
priations process. By protecting Congress's role via the legislature's
constitutionally afforded power to appropriate funds, the War
Powers Appropriations Act represents a solution that accomplishes
the goal of forcing the executive to consult with Congress, while
avoiding the potential pitfalls of unconstitutionality, inartful draft-
ing, and presidential disregard.
Illustrating the need for the War Powers Appropriations Act
demands that the issues concerning war power be confronted from
constitutional, historical, and political perspectives. Accordingly,
this Note proceeds with its argument in the following parts. The
first part addresses the constitutional angle, establishing the Fram-
ers' intent to lodge America's power to go to war with the
Congress. The second part details the historical evolution of presi-
dents' use of war power, highlighting how presidents' early use of
military force displays a deference to Congress, while more recent
military actions reveal the executive's dominance in making war.
The third part discusses the judiciary's involvement, noting how,
while a few early court decisions expressly recognized Congress's
war power, more recent jurisprudence has been unhelpful in re-
storing the constitutional Framers' vision regarding the balancing
of war power between legislative and executive branches. The
fourth part details the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the ques-
tions regarding its constitutionality, the problems posed by its
inartful drafting, and U.S. presidents' blatant disregard for the
Resolution's provisions. Finally, the Note presents the War Powers
Appropriations Act as a means by which Congress could use its
constitutional power of the purse to ensure congressional input in
war-making decisions.
I. THE FRAMERS' INTENT: WAR POWER AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Delegate comments at the Philadelphia Convention, the text of
Article I of the Constitution, and Framers' remarks all provide evi-
dence of the Framers' intent to vest America's power to go to war
with the legislature.
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A. Delegate Comments at the Convention Reveal the Intended Balance of
the War Power Between the Legislature and President
The delegates debated the proper balance between Congress
and the president regarding the power to wage war, prompting
various revisions to the Constitution's text. Under the Articles of
Confederation, the Congress possessed both legislative and execu-
tive powers, permitting a relatively simple war power provision,
namely that the "United States in Congress assembled, shall have
the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace
and war."8
The initial draft of the Constitution, with its system of separated
powers, afforded Congress the power "to make war."9 At first,
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina sought to shift this power to
the Senate, which was smaller, more knowledgeable in foreign af-
fairs, and-on account of its treaty power-best able to make
peace.10 Pierce Butler, also of South Carolina, sought to further
condense the war power, calling for "vesting the power in the
President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not
make war but when the Nation will support it."" Butler's motion
received no recorded support,12 and was met with strong opposi-
tion by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts-who was distrustful of "a
motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war"-and
George Mason, of Virginia, who believed the Executive could not
safely be trusted with this authority.13
After both Pinckney and Butler's proposals were dropped, dis-
cussion centered on a motion made by James Madison of Virginia
and Gerry to substitute the word "declare" for "make." 4 The pur-
pose of such a change was not to shift the war power from the
legislative to the executive branch. 5 Rather, as explained in the
8. Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
81 YALE LJ. 672, 674 (1972) (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VI, IX).
9. BRIEN HALLETT, THE LOST ART OF DECLARING WAR 43 (1998); see also Note, Con-
gress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1773-74
(1968).
10. Lofgren, supra note 8, at 675; see also HALLETr, supra note 9, at 43.
11. HALLETr, supra note 9, at 43 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 318 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECOgRDS]); see also Lofgren, supra note 8,
at 675.
12. Lofgren, supra note 8, at 675.
13. Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 39-40 (1972)
(quoting 2 RECORDS, supra note 11, at 318-19).
14. HALLETT, supra note 9, at 43; see also Lofgren, supra note 8, at 675 (citing 2 RE-
CORDS, supra note 11, at 318).
15. Note, supra note 9, at 1773 ("When the proposal to substitute 'declare' for 'make'
was introduced, the debates over the issue indicate that the new wording was not intended
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record by Rufus King of Massachusetts, the change was made out
of concern that "make war" might suggest that Congress possessed
the power to conduct war, which the Convention believed to be a
function for the executive.16 Elaborating on the change, James Wil-
son of Pennsylvania stated that Congress reserved the power to
declare war, thus protecting the United States against the prospect
of being "hurried" into war, while ensuring "that no 'single man
[can]... involve us in such distress.' ,1 7 Such comments suggest the
Framers' strong sense that war-making power was most appropri-
ately allocated to Congress.
In addition to revealing the Framers' preference for strong con-
gressional war power, the "declare war" debate also showcases the
delegates' practical sensibilities. While Rufus King provided one
rationale for the change, Madison and Gerry also sought the
amendment in order to permit the president "the power to repel
sudden attacks.' 8 Outside of this emergency situation, however,
the record reflects the Convention's desire for Congress to decide
when the United States went to war.19
Not all delegates may have understood the textual substitution
in the same way. Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who believed
"[t] he Executive [should] be able to repel and not to commence
war," considered the change unnecessary, believing that "make
war" already authorized the president to repel sudden attacks.
20
Additionally, there was a discrepancy in the vote tally recording the
amendment's passage. Madison recorded the measure as having an
initial vote of 7-2 in favor of adoption, with the count moving to 8-1
in favor after Rufus King's remarks defending the executive's
power to conduct war.2' However, Max Ferrand-in his official
journal of the Convention-recorded the first vote as 4-5 against
with the 8-1 passage occurring after King's comments.22 If Ferrand's
to shift from the legislature to the Executive this general power to engage the country in
war.").
16. Berger, supra note 13, at 40.
17. Id. at 36 (quoting 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)).
18. Joseph R. Biden,Jr. &John B. Ritch III, The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A
joint Decision' Solution, 77 CEO. L.J. 367, 374 (1988) (quoting Lofgren, supra note 8, at 675);
see also Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 6-7 (1995); PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS:
HOW THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE CONSTITUTION 6 (2005); Note, supra note 9,
at 1773 ("At most, the sole reason for the substitution was to confirm the Executive's power
to repel sudden attacks."').
19. See Note, supra note 9, at 1773 ("In all other cases the commitment of the country
to a trial of force with another nation was to remain the prerogative of Congress.").
20. See Lofgren, supra note 8, at 676.
21. Id. at 676-77 (internal citations omitted).
22. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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account is more accurate, the change in language from "make war"
to "declare war" could actually be perceived as an explicit broaden-
ing of presidential war power. At a minimum, these observations
reveal that the content of the "declare war" debate meant different
things to different delegates, thereby warranting additional explo-
ration outside the "declare war" discussion to ascertain the
Framers' true intentions.
Delegate comments spoken outside the "declare war" debate re-
veal the Framers' preference for Congress, and not the president,
to administer the war power. Earlier in the Convention, as the dele-
gates debated the construction of the executive branch, delegates
were unequivocal in their preference that Congress and not the
president control the war power. Charles Pinckney "was afraid the
Executive powers of [the existing] Congress might extend to peace
& war &c which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the
worst kind, to wit an elective one. 23 Similarly, John Rutledge of
South Carolina wanted a single executive "'tho' he was not for giv-
ing him the power of war and peace." 24 Finally, James Wilson also
advocated for a single executive, but did not believe "the Preroga-
tives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the
Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a legislative
nature. Among others that of war & peace &c.,,15 Thus, delegate
comments outside the context of the "declare war" debate confirm
the Framers' intent to allocate the war power to Congress.
It can also be argued that these comments of the Framers are ir-
relevant to the contemporary administration of America's war
power. Of the 1,273 pages of the Constitutional Convention's
printed record, less than two cover the debate regarding the
proper allocation of war power. 6 The war power debate occurred
on only one day-August 17, 1787-as delegates debated the
Committee on Detail's draft reported on August 6.17 One interpre-
tation of the scant attention the Framers paid to war power is to say
the issue was simply not that relevant, and that drawing broad con-
clusions from limited debate is an inappropriate basis for
developing a legislative proposal reforming war power. An alterna-
tive explanation, however, might be that debate on war powers was
23. Louis Fisher, Historical Suruey of the War Powers and the Use of Force, in THE U.S. CON-
STITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 12 (Gary
M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994) (citing 1 RECORDS, supra note 11, at 64-66).
24. Id. (same).
25. Id. (citing I RECORDS, supra note 11, at 65-66).
26. Peter Raven-Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause, in THE U.S. CON-
STITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR, supra note 23, at 30 (citing 2 RECORDS, supra
note 11, at 318-19); Lofgren, supra note 8, at 675 (same).
27. See Lofgren, supra note 8, at 675 (citing 2 RECORDS, supra note 11, at 181-82).
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brief on account of the Convention quickly reaching consensus on
the issue.
A second potential methodological critique could argue that the
Framers' thoughts on war power are inapplicable to contemporary
geopolitics. Among those espousing this view include former Sec-
retary of State Cyrus Vance, who believed that the Framers "lived in
a very different world" and that their thoughts regarding America's
fledgling military power spoken in the late eighteenth century
should not govern contemporary foreign policy.28 While Secretary
Vance is undoubtedly correct that the United States has changed
from a budding republic to a dominant world power, his remarks
concerning the Constitution's inapplicability to "today's complex
world" are likely misplaced.2 Particularly in light of the various ex-
tra-constitutional measures employed during the Bush
Administration's prosecution of the Global War on Terror, a return
to constitutional principles in the realm of national security and
war power is warranted. The Framers' comments at the Philadel-
phia Convention during the summer of 1787 evidence the intent
to place the war power in the hands of Congress.
B. The Text and Structure of the Constitution Support the Delegates'
Intention to Vest the War Power in the Legislature
In addition to the Framers' comments, the Constitution's struc-
ture reveals the delegates' intention to entrust Congress with
managing the war power. Although the president is Commander-
in-Chief, the constitutional structure denies him the ability to make
war without Congress's consent. Congress has the power:
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money
to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
28. See Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War Pow-
ers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 84 (1984).
29. Id.
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To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Mili-
tia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed
in the Service of the United States ....
These five clauses serve to place "ultimate power" over the nation's
military in the hands of Congress. 3'
While the president is only able to act with Congress's consent,
Congress is able to instigate hostilities without executive consent.
In Article I, Section 8, the Framers afforded Congress the power to
"[g] rant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concern-
ing Captures on Land and Water., 32 This addition to Congress's
enumerated powers was made by Elbridge Gerry following the "de-
clare war" debate, out of concern that any narrowing of Congress's
authority should not prohibit Congress's peacetime granting of
letters of marque and reprisal, which could potentially prevent the
necessity of going to war. Such letters could, for example, author-
ize sending military forces abroad to protect Americans overseas or
retrieve unlawfully seized property, and the Framers fully under-
stood that armed reprisals constituted acts of war. 4 As such, in
addition to the Framers' comments at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the enumerated powers of Article I suggest Congress-and
not the president-to be preeminent when it comes to war power.
C. Additional Evidence Following the Philadelphia
Convention Supports this Notion of Congressional
War Power Supremacy
In advocating for the Constitution's ratification in THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 69, Alexander Hamilton explicitly addressed the balance of
war power between Congress and the president:
The President is to be Commander-in-Chief of the army and
navy of the United States. In this respect his authority ...
would amount to nothing more than the supreme command
and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General
and Admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British
King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-16.
31. IRONS, supra note 18, at 23.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
33. Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power,
134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035, 1060-61 (1986).
34. See Irons, supra note 18, at 22.
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regulating of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution
under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.3 5
Thus, according to Hamilton, the president's war power author-
ity is strictly limited. Equally illustrative of the Framers' intent is an
April 2, 1798 letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, in
which Madison notes: "The constitution supposes, what the History
of all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most
interested in war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly with stud-
ied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl. 36
Thus, delegate comments at the Philadelphia Convention, the
enumerated Article I powers, and Framers' remarks made subse-
quent to the Constitution's drafting all provide evidence of the
Framers' intent to lodge America's power to go to war with the na-
tional legislature. Madison's letter is especially salient, as it
represents correspondence discussing the balance of war power
between two future commanders-in-chief. While the future fourth
president's comments are insightful, a historical survey of Ameri-
can military actions is necessary to discover how the Framers'
theoretical balance of war power between Congress and the presi-
dent was implemented in practice.
II. CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND WAR: A HISTORICAL SURVEY
While American presidents' early use of military force displayed
tremendous deference to Congress, more recent military actions
have exhibited the executive's dominance in making war. Review-
ing the historical record of America's military activity demonstrates
that, for the nation's first one hundred-sixty years, the administra-
tion of war power mirrored the balance the Framers proscribed,
permitting the legislature predominance over the executive
branch.3 ' However, beginning with the Korean War in the early
1950s, the executive has come to dominate the use of America's
military power, leaving Congress with a subservient role and betray-
ing the Framers' original intent. As such, the history of American
war-making-with its continued transfer of war power from the leg-
islature to the Executive-demonstrates the need for war power
legislative reform in order to restore the system of congressional
supremacy the Founders envisioned.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
36. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798) reprinted in 6 THE
WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON: 1790-1802, at 312 (G. Hunt ed., 1906).
37. Louis FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 15 (2000).
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A. The Early Use of the War Power Followed the Framers'
Intended Balance
The earliest examples of American military action firmly estab-
lish legislative dominance in war-making. In confronting Indian
attacks on the frontier, President Washington acknowledged that
his constitutional authority permitted only defensive actions
against the hostile Indian forces)8 Secretary of War Henry Knox
advised territorial governors that military operations could only
amount to "defensive measures" until Congress, which was "solely
... vested with the powers of War" authorized offensive engage-
ment. 9 Furthermore, in suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion of
1794, President Washington acted expressly on the congressionally
delegated authority provided in 1792 legislation authorizing Wash-
ington to call up the state militias should the United States "be
invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign
nation or Indian tribe."
40
President Adams displayed similar deference to the Congress
during the Quasi-War with France from 1798 to 1800. Upon initial
review, it may seem that Adams-who deployed naval forces with-
out Congress declaring war-betrayed the Constitution's grant of
war power to Congress. However, closer inspection reveals that
President Adams did not act unilaterally, instead going to the Con-
gress, which subsequently debated various defense measures and
passed several dozen bills in preparation for war.4' In fact, Congress
ultimately demonstrated more belligerence than Adams, passing
several bills aimed at encouraging the war effort.
President Jefferson also recognized legislative supremacy regard-
ing war power during his confrontation with Barbary Pirates. When
the Bey of Tripoli threatened the United States with war, Jefferson
dispatched a squadron of frigates. Despite the Bey's declaration of
war-via the custom of chopping down the flagpole of the consu-
late-Jefferson ordered the navy to release any prisoners and
vessels captured after having disarmed them, as Jefferson believed
his authority to act in defense of the country did not permit
38. See id. at 15-16.
39. Id. (quoting 4 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 195, 220-21 (Cla-
rence Edwin Carter ed., 1936)).
40. SeeFISHER, supra note 18, at 16 (quoting I Stat. 264, § 1 (1792)).
41. See Fisher, supra note 23, at 14; see also FISHER, supra note 37, at 16; FISHER, supra
note 18, at 17; IRONS, supra note 18, at 35; ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR.,
THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 10 (1982).
42. Biden & Ritch, supra note 18, at 375 ("Indeed, Congress ultimately became more
belligerent than Adams, passing a number of measures aimed at encouraging successful
prosecution of the conflict."(internal citation omitted)).
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aggressive action, even after an adversary's declaration of war.43 In
his request for "authorizing measures of offense," Jefferson told
Congress that naval forces were "unauthorized by the Constitution,
without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of de-
fense.""
Less than a decade later, on November 5, 1811, President Madi-
son submitted a message to Congress, describing several hostile
actions by Great Britain and requesting that Congress prepare for
war. Noting how the British had "[t] rampl [ed] on rights which no
independent nation can relinquish," Madison hoped that Congress
"[w] ill feel the duty of putting the United States into an armor and
an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the
national spirit and expectations."4 After detailing various "injuries
and indignities" to Congress on June 1, 1812, Madison left to Con-
gress the decision to declare war, "a solemn question which the
Constitution wisely confides to the legislative department of the
Government. 4 6 Congress declared war on June 18, 1812.4' Thus,
the military actions of America's first four Commanders-in-Chief-
Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison-all exhibit the Ex-
ecutive's deference to Congress, as envisioned at the Philadelphia
Convention.
B. The Executive Now Dominates the Use of America's Military Power
The beginning of the Korean War in 1950 marked the end of
presidential deference to Congress in the conduct of war. While
from 1789 through 1950, presidents did use military force unilat-
erally on occasion, those military actions, as scholar Edward S.
Corwin described them, consisted largely of "fights with pirates,
landings of small naval contingents on barbarous or semi-
barbarous coasts, the dispatch of small bodies of troops to chase
bandits or cattle rustlers across the Mexican border, and the like."
41
However, in 1950, President Truman-completely without congres-
sional declaration, authorization, or consultation-committed the
United States to war in Korea, a conflict that would last three years
43. See Note, supra note 9, at 1779; see also THOMAS& THOMAS, supra note 41, at 10.
44. Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message (December 8, 1801), in 1 MESSAGES AND PA-
PERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 327 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).
45. See FISHER, supra note 18, at 28 (quoting 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 479 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897)).
46. See id. (quoting 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 489-90 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897)).
47. Id. at 29.
48. Edward S. Corwin, The President's Power, NEW REPUBLIC,Jan. 29, 1951, at 16.
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at a cost of more than 140,000 casualties. 49 Rather that seek ap-
proval from the United States Constitution, Truman justified his
authority using the United Nations Charter, a treaty and the su-
preme law of the land, and resolutions taken pursuant to that
Charter authorizing the use of force. 0
Justifying the action, Truman's Secretary of State Dean Rusk
wrote: "As Commander-in-Chief the President can deploy the
Armed Forces and order them into active operations. In an age of
missiles and hydrogen warheads, his powers are as large as the
situation requires .. .. ,5 Secretary Rusk's analysis of executive au-
thority served as a preview to presidents' continued use of the war
power without congressional authorization.
In 1962, President Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine of Cuba
without congressional permission. Additionally, President Ken-
nedy in 1962 deployed the first large contingent of American
troops to Vietnam without seeking prior congressional authoriza-
tion.53 Although President Johnson did receive congressional
authorization with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 54 in 1964 for con-
tinued military action in Southeast Asia, President Johnson did not
consult Congress when sending over twenty thousand troops to the
Dominican Republic in 1965 in an effort to prevent communist
takeover.5 President Ford's attack on the Mayaguez vessel, President
Carter's Iranian hostage rescue operation, President Reagan's mis-
sions to Grenada, Lebanon, and Libya, and President Bush's
capture of Panamanian dictator Noriega were all conducted with-
authorzaon.56 While President Bush did finallyout congressional hrzain h  sdn 6  ial
seek eleventh-hour legislation from Congress to wage the Persian
Gulf War, President Bush did not consider such permission neces-
sary. In remarks that seem a far cry from the words of Washington,
Adams, Jefferson, and Madison, President Bush in a January 8,
1991 response to reporters asking him whether he needed con-
gressional authorization to wage war against Iraq stated, "I don't
think I need it ... I feel that I have the authority to fully imple-
ment the United Nations resolutions.",7 His remarks during the
49. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 41, at 20.
50. See id; see also FISHER, supra note 37, at 40; Vance, supra note 28, at 80.
51. Dean Rusk, The President, 38 FOREIGN AnF. 353, 357 (1959).
52. See Vance, supra note 28, at 80; see also Fisher, supra note 23, at 23.
53. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 41, at 25.
54. Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security
in Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin Resolution), Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
55. SeeTHOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 41, at 25-26; see also Vance, supra note 28, at 80.
56. See FISHER, supra note 18, at 136-48.
57. The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis (Jan. 9, 1991) 27
WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 25 (1991).
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1992 presidential campaign were even more pointed: "I didn't have
to get permission from some old goat in the United States Con-
gress to kick Saddarn Hussein out of Kuwait."58 President Bush's
words translated into action when, in December 1992, he sent U.S.
troops to Somalia without congressional authorization, a military
action that would continue during President Clinton's first year in
office. For his part, President Clinton seemed to accept his prede-
cessor's view of executive war power, launching an unauthorized
bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 that lasted in excess of
sixty days. 9
This historical survey is not meant to suggest that presidents now
only conduct wars without the consent of Congress. Over the past
few administrations, presidents have often received congressional
authorization for major military conflicts, including the Vietnam
War, the Persian Gulf War, and the current military actions in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq.6° However, the historical survey presented
above does demonstrate an increased willingness and ability on the
part of the Executive to act without Congress in making war. Thus,
while American presidents' early use of military force exhibited
deference to Congress, history has illustrated the president's steady
expropriation of the war power at Congress's expense. The con-
temporary situation whereby the president is able to wage war
without any form of congressional authorization runs afoul of the
Framers' intent in balancing the war power between the legislative
and executive branches. This Note proposes a legislative measure
to remedy this situation and restore Congress's role in war-making.
However, before discussing legislative reform, it is first necessary to
exhaust an alternative remedial forum, namely the courts.
III. MIXED MESSAGES: How THEJUDICIARY HAS
ADDRESSED WAR POWER
Notwithstanding a few early Supreme Court decisions defending
Congress's predominance over the president in exercising war
power, the judiciary has been largely unhelpful in restoring the
constitutional Framers' original vision. Initial decisions arising out
58. IRONS, supra note 18, at 210.
59. See GENE HEALY, THE CULT OF THE PRESIDENCY 126 (2008).
60. Persian Gulf War Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution,
Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Star. 1497 (2002); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L.
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Pub.
L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991); Joint Resolution To Promote the Maintenance of Interna-
tional Peace and Security in Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin Resolution), Pub. L. No. 88-408,
78 Stat. 384 (1964).
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of the Quasi-War with France affirmed Congress's authority, but
subsequent holdings-most especially the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in The Prize Cases6' and United States v. Curtiss-Wright2-seemed
to imbue the president with extra-constitutional war power author-
ity.63 By the time litigation arose during the Vietnam and Persian
Gulf Wars, the courts timidly refused to decide the issue, claiming
the issue to be a nonjusticiable political question. 4 As such, the
judiciary does not represent a viable means for mandating the con-
stitutionally required congressional input in war-making decisions.
A. The Earliest Supreme Court Cases Pertaining to War Power
Affirmed Congress's Authority
The earliest Supreme Court cases pertaining to war power arose
out of the Quasi-War with France between 1798 and 1800, which,
although authorized by congressional statute, was undeclared.
Writing in 1800, the Supreme Court noted in Bas v. Tingy,65 that
regardless of whether hostilities were declared or undeclared, the
conflict still constituted "war" in the constitutional sense, with the
declared war being "perfect" and "general" war and the unde-
clared war constituting "imperfect" and "limited" war.66 While the
Court did not expressly identify Congress to be the dominant
player in war-making decisions, the Court strongly implied this
message:
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or congress
may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects, and in
time. If a general war is declared, its extent and operations
are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a
part of the law of nations; but if a partial war is waged, its ex-
tent and operation depend on our municipal laws [as passed
by Congress] .67
61. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
62. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
63. See Note, supra note 9, at 1780 (identifying The Prize Cases as the "final stamp of ap-
proval on [the] expanding power of the President to make war without prior
authorization .... ."); see also Comment, supra note 4, at 1241 n.66 (1984) (describing Curtiss-
Wright's "extremely broad reading of presidential foreign affairs power").
64. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311 (2d Cir. 1973); Mitchell v.
Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-
43 (2d Cir. 1971).
65. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
66. Id. at 40; see also FISHER, supra note 18, at 18; Biden & Ritch, supra note 18, at 375.
67. Bas, 4 U.S. at 43; see also Lofgren, supra note 8, at 701.
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68The Court was far more explicit in Talbot v. Seeman, an 1801
case also with origins in the Quasi-War with France. In Talbot, the
newly-sworn Chief Justice John Marshall confronted a dispute be-
tween Captain Silas Talbot, whose American warship (the U.S.S.
Constitution) libeled the Amelia, a Hamburgh vessel that had been
captured by the French.69 In finding Captain Talbot's seizure of the
Amelia lawful, Justice Marshall held that although war had not been
declared against France, Congress had authorized the U.S. Navy to
capture French vessels, and since the Amelia was carrying eight car-
riage guns and in possession of the French, there was sufficient
probable cause for Captain Talbot to capture the ship.0 Most nota-
ble is Justice Marshall's explicit statement regarding Congress's war
power:
The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the
United States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can
alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry. It is not de-
nied, nor in the course of the argument has it been denied,
that congress may authorize general hostilities, in which case
the general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hos-
tilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as they actually
apply to our situation, must be noticed.
To determine the real situation of America in regard to
71France, the acts of congress are to be inspected.
Justice Marshall more precisely defined his views regarding the
balance of war power between the legislative and executive
branches in Little v. Barreme,72 an 1804 case also arising out of the
Quasi-War. In Little, Justice Marshall held that in authorizing war,
Congress may place limits on the president's conduct. The facts of
Little relay the story of Congress authorizing President Adams to
seize ships sailing to French ports, with President Adams-contrary
to Congress's wishes-issuing an order to capture vessels sailing to
or from French ports.7v Captain George Little seized a Danish ship
sailing from a French port, and was subsequently sued for dam-
ages. Marshall, in deciding the case, held that Captain Little could
68. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id. at 27-45.
71. Id. at 28-29; see also FISHER, supra note 18, at 18; FISHER, supra note 37, at 18-19;
Biden & Ritch, supra note 18, at 375; Lofgren, supra note 26, at 701; Comment, supra note 4,
at 1233.
72. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
73. Id. at 171.
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be held liable for damages,4 thus ruling that orders issued by the
Commander-in-Chief during wartime are still subject to Congress's
• • 75
restrictions. Such a ruling clearly indicates Justice Marshall's be-
lief that, on war-making decisions, Congress reigned supreme over
the president.
The Court affirmed the notion of congressional war power su-
premacy in Martin v. Mott,76 a controversy arising in 1827 in the
aftermath of the War of 1812. While some cite this case as support
for broad presidential war power, the Court actually imposed limits
on the president's authority.77 In the decision, Justice Story sus-
tained the delegation by Congress to the president of the authority
to call up the militia, but the Court carefully constricted the cir-
cumstances in which the president could act, noting the
president's power to be "a limited power, confined to cases of ac-
tual invasion, or of imminent danger of invasion., 78 Furthermore,
the Court confirmed that the president did not hold any inherent
war power authority; he could only exercise war power when such
power was "confided by Congress to the President."79 These four
decisions illustrate early Supreme Court recognition of Congress's
dominant role, thus fulfilling the Framers' original vision for the
balance of war power.
B. Subsequent Decisions Imbued the President with
Extra-constitutional War Power Authority
In two decisions-one rendered in 1862 pertaining to President
Lincoln's conduct at the start of the Civil War, the other decided in
1936 discussing the president's role in foreign affairs-the Su-
preme Court expanded presidential war power. The Supreme
Court addressed Lincoln's order to blockade southern ports and
seize ships without Congress's authorization in The Prize Cases,8"
splitting five to four, with the majority sustaining the Union sei-
zures." According to the Court's opinion, the president's inherent
authority as Commander-in-Chief justified his action82 and, even if
74. Id. at 179.
75. See Fisher, supra note 23, at 15; see also FISHER, supra note 18, at 19.
76. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
77. Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REv.
101, 121 (1984).
78. Martin, 25 U.S. at 29.
79. Id.; see also Carter, supra note 77, at 121.
80. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
81. Id. at 680.
82. Id. at 666-70; see also Carter, supra note 77, at 120.
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he lacked the constitutional authority to issue the blockade, Con-
gress ratified the blockade via subsequent legislation, thus
rendering this military action without Congress's consent a valid
exercise of the war power.3
The Supreme Court further weakened Congress's ability to in-
tervene on the president's foreign affairs activity in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.84 in 1936. Upholding the president's dec-
laration of an arms embargo, the Court noted, "the powers of
external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of
the Constitution""' and that "participation [by Congress] in the
exercise of the power is significantly limited. 86 Citing "this vast ex-
ternal realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems"7 Justice Sutherland, writing the majority opin-
ion, argued that the president has an inherent power to be "the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations."88 Justice Sutherland further elaborated on this view of
presidential supremacy in foreign affairs, focusing specifically on
war:
[H]e, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing
the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and espe-
cially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of dip-
lomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of
information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and
the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.8 9
Thus, according to Justice Sutherland's constitutional interpre-
tation, it is the president-and not Congress-who is predominant
in exercising war power. In both The Prize Cases and Curtiss-Wright,
the Supreme Court has undermined its previous commitment to
congressional war power, and provided support to those who sup-
port broad presidential war-making authority.
83. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670-71; see also Carter, supra note 77, at 120.
84. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
85. Id. at 318.
86. Id. at 319.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 320; see also FISHER, supra note 18, at 60.
89. Curtiss-Wigh 299 U.S. at 320; see also THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 41, at xi;
ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF
LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 79 (1991).
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C. Modern Courts Refuse to Rule on War Power, Declaring the
Issue a Nonjusticiable Political Question
In more recent decisions, the courts have adopted a different
approach, refusing to decide cases concerning war power on
grounds that the issue is a nonjusticiable political question. During
the Vietnam War, Members of Congress sought assistance from the
courts in reasserting their constitutionally-provided war power.
However, rather than hear these cases, the judiciary sidestepped
the issue, declining to hear cases concerning the constitutionality
of the continuation of the war on grounds that the political ques-
tion doctrine prevented the courts from deciding the issue. 90
During the Reagan and Bush Administrations, courts declined to
reach the merits in war powers cases relying on other excuses in-
cluding mootness,9 ' ripeness, standing," the doctrines on judicial
prudence and equitable discretion, and the notion that Congress
would be a better fact-finder than the courts on this issue.95 Unlike
the early Supreme Court cases, or the subsequent Prize Cases and
Curtiss-Wright decisions, the judicial branch over the last thirty years
has steered clear of the war powers issue.
While the Supreme Court once served as a bulwark in defense of
Congress's predominance over the president in administering the
war power, subsequent Supreme Court decisions undermined
Congress's constitutional authority. The courts have thus revealed
themselves as unable to restore the balance of war power to the
Framers' original vision. The judiciary's more recent strategy of
treating war power as a nonjusticiable political question has un-
equivocally established that the courts cannot be trusted to protect
90. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (2d Cir. 1973); DaCosta
v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1152 (2d Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615-16 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1971); Luftig v. McNamara,
373 F.2d 664, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715, 728-30
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971). For additional cases and more informa-
tion on courts employing the political question doctrine, see Harold Hongju Koh, Judicial
Constraints: The Courts and War Powers, in, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO
TO WAR, supra note 23, at 121.
91. FISHER, supra note 18, at 197 n.36 (citing Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1126-
29 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
92. FISHER, supra note 18, at 198 n.37 (citing Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 515-17
(D.D.C. 1990); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1149 (D.D.C. 1990)).
93. FISHER, supra note 18, at 198 n.38 (citing Dornan v. U.S. Sec'y of Def., 851 F.2d
450, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam)).
94. FISHER, supra note 18, at 198 n.39 (citing Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337-
39 (D.D.C. 1987); Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (D.D.C. 1984)).
95. FISHER, supra note 18, at 198 n.40 (citing Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893,
898-99 (D.D.C. 1982), af/d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,
568 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
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Congress. For this reason, Congress must seek to help itself, acting
to pass a legislative war power reform act to ensure that its input is
considered when the United States goes to war.
IV. CONGRESS'S PREvIous EFFORT: THE WAR
POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973
Throughout American history, Congress has launched legislative
efforts in defense of its constitutionally-provided war power, the
most famous being the War Powers Resolution of 1973. A survey of
the War Powers Resolution, as well as previous congressional at-
tempts to safeguard its war-making prerogative, demonstrates the
futility of these efforts. During the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, presidents routinely ignored legislation designed to defend
Congress's war power. The current legislative measure designed to
ensure congressional input-the War Powers Resolution-suffers
from several inadequacies including questionable constitutionality,
inartful drafting, and presidential disregard.
A. Presidents Routinely Ignored Legislation During the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
Congress's earliest legislative attempt to limit presidential war
power occurred in the aftermath of the Civil War. In 1868, Con-
gress passed a law mandating a procedure by which the president
was to confront foreign governments who were holding American
citizens: the president first had to demand an explanation, then
demand the citizen's release, and only after completing those two
steps could he then use such means "not amounting to acts of
war."96 This law, however, was ambiguous as to both the situations to
which it applied and the scope of presidential action authorized.
This 1868 law had no practical effect and, in subsequent years,
presidents deployed troops throughout Latin America, the Middle
East, and Asia, all without following the prescribed procedure and
all without congressional authorization. 97
In 1912, Congress again sought to limit the president's war
power, attaching a rider limiting the president's ability to commit
troops to an appropriations bill. However, at the urging of Former
96. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 41, at 117 (quoting Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249,
§ 3, 15 Stat. 223, 224 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2006))).
97. Id. at 118.
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Secretary of State Elihu Root, the rider was dropped amid ques-
tions regarding its constitutionality.8
In a third example, Senator Gerald Nye and his isolationist col-
leagues attempted to constrain presidential war power in the late
1930s with a series of "Neutrality Acts."99 Despite the pleas of Presi-
dent Roosevelt as well as Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Congress
maintained these laws, only to see presidential will triumph in July
1940 when Roosevelt disregarded the Neutrality Acts and agreed to
lend Prime Minister Winston Churchill fifty destroyers in exchange
for military basing rights in Bermuda and Newfoundland. l°° Sena-
tor Nye's Neutrality Acts were not the only congressional measures
designed to limit President Roosevelt's ability to entangle the
United States in overseas conflict. In the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940, Congress included a provision prohibiting the
deployment of U.S. armed forces outside the Western Hemi-
sphere. 0 1 However, within months of the bill's passage, President
Roosevelt dispatched troops to Greenland and Iceland without
congressional authorization.
0 2
Finally, in various self-defense treaties, Congress has attempted
to limit presidential war power, inserting language demanding that
action by each signatory would be taken under the treaties "to
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes." 10 3 Such language may have been inserted in defense of
Congress's prerogative to declare war, yet, as has been recognized
in a previous part, Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson all
deployed military force without congressional authorization, using
America's self-defense treaty obligations to justify their actions.
While these previous legislative efforts to reform the balance of war
power have gone largely unrecognized, Congress's latest attempt-
the War Powers Resolution of 1973-has been the subject of
tremendous controversy.
98. Id.
99. TURNER, supra note 89, at 2.
100. Id. at 7.
101. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 41, at 118.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 119 (quoting North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 43 Am.J. INT'L L. (Supp.),
at 159, 34 U.N.T.S. 243).
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B. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 Represents Congress's
Most Significant Attempt to Reassert Itself in
the War-Making Process
As the United States found itself in an increasingly unpopular
war in Vietnam, the Senate adopted the National Commitments
Resolution in 1969, stating its sense that national commitments
could only be launched via "affirmative action taken by the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the United States Government by
means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses
of Congress specifically providing for such commitment. 1°4 The
final version of the War Powers Resolution was reported out on
October 4, 1973 and the legislation was passed on November 7,
1973 over President Nixon's veto.
05
The mechanics of the War Powers Resolution provided for tight
procedural constraints upon the president's deployment of Ameri-
can armed forces. Section 2(c) of the Resolution established three
situations in which the president may use the military: (1) when
Congress declares war, (2) when Congress otherwise authorizes the
use of force, and (3) when the United States or its armed forces
are under attack. 10 6 Section 3 mandated that the president consult
with Congress "in every possible instance" before U.S. forces are
deployed and that the president consult regularly with Congress
following the introduction of forces. 10 7 Section 4 required that
when U.S. forces are deployed without congressional authoriza-
tion, the president must report such military action to Congress
within forty-eight hours.08 Section 5 required that the president
withdraw all military personnel no later than sixty days after a re-
port is required unless Congress specifically authorizes the use of
force.'09 This sixty-day window could be expanded by thirty days if
the president certifies that additional time is needed to safely ex-
tricate the troops."0 Section 5(c) provided a congressional veto
over presidential use of the armed forces, allowing Congress to
104. National Commitments Resolution, S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG.
REc. 17245 (1969); see also Ellen C. Collier, Statutory Constraints: The War Powers Resolution, in
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO Go TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PER-
SPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 54, 57.
105. Pub. L. No. 93-148 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (2006)). See also
Collier, supra note 104, at 58; FISHER, supra note 18, at 130.
106. War Powers Resolution of Nov. 7, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(c).
107. §3.
108. § 4(a).
109. § 5(b).
110. §5(b).
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direct the removal of military force via passage of a concurrent
resolution."'
A review of the War Powers Resolution's thirty-five year tenure
reveals the legislation has failed in its stated mission to "insure that
the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President
will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities .... "" Three main issues have undermined the War
Powers Resolution's efficacy: (1) questions regarding the Resolu-
tion's constitutionality; (2) the Resolution's inartful drafting; and
(3) presidential disregard for the Resolution's provisions.
1. Scholars Question the Resolution's Constitutionality
Ever since the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in INS v.
Chadha,"' the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution has
been subject to debate. In Chadha, the Supreme Court definitively
held that legislative vetoes are unconstitutional because they vio-
late the Constitution's Presentment Clause.1 4 Section 5(c) of the
War Powers Resolution contained such a legislative veto, granting
Congress the option to force the president to withdraw troops via
passage of a concurrent resolution.' As such, most scholars-
including many supporters of the War Powers Resolution-believe
Section 5(c) to be unconstitutional. 6 There are, however, defend-
ers who believe the War Powers Resolution remains constitutional,
even in a post-Chadha world.
Some argue that Chadha can be distinguished, since Chadha in-
volved a one-house legislative veto in a domestic context, while the
War Powers Resolution invokes a two-house concurrent resolution
and involves an international question."7 It can further be argued
that the Chadha court was concerned with separation of powers is-
sues arising from overly broad legislative delegations of power to
111. § 5(c).
112. § 2(a).
113. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
114. Id. at 958. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the
President of the United States ...."); cl. 3 ("Every order, resolution, or vote to which the
concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States ...
115. Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(c).
116. See Biden & Ritch, supra note 18, at 388 ("In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's
1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, which found that legislative vetoes violate the Constitution's
presentment clause, most scholars who otherwise support the Resolution's constitutionality
accept the unconstitutionality of § 5(c)." (internal citations omitted)).
117. SeeVance, supra note 28, at 86.
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the executive, thereby distinguishing the War Powers Resolution,
which seeks to wrest power from the executive branch. 18 Another
argument is that Congress, in passing the War Powers Resolution,
was simply defining the word "war" in Article I, and providing an
enforcement mechanism for Congress to maintain its constitution-
ally provided check on the president."9
Even if Section 5 (c) of the Resolution is constitutionally shaky,
Section 5(b)-the provision prohibiting the president from de-
ploying armed forces for more than sixty days without
congressional authorization-remains intact.20 Supporters also
note that if Congress always had exclusive control of the war power,
the Resolution, rather than have any legislative effect, would
merely set forth a congressional plan of action thereby keeping the
statute constitutional even after the Supreme Court's decision in
Chadha. 2 But even if these arguments can be marshaled in support
of the War Powers Resolution's constitutionality, the fact remains
that the legislation is constitutionally suspect.
2. The Resolution Is Inartfully Drafted
A second critique of the War Powers Resolution is that the stat-
ute is inartfully drafted. The critics' assault begins with the title,
and continues throughout much of the statute's provisions. Some
have argued that by calling the law a "Resolution," Congress un-
dermined the statute's efficacy, as presidents and the public might
be more willing to disregard the law as a "mere resolution" instead
122
of something more serious. On a less cosmetic note, Section
2(c)'s enumerated list of when the president can use force is too
narrow, omitting two instances-namely a military operation rescu-
ing Americans and a military operation forestalling an imminent
attack-that should probably be authorized. 2 3 Furthermore, Sec-
tion 5(b) is at odds with the president's constitutional authority to
repel attacks, as Section 5(b) does not exempt from the sixty-day
clock those instances where the president is acting to repel an
118. See id. at 86-87.
119. See Carter, supra note 77, at 101-02.
120. See id. at 133.
121. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1237 ("[A~s to the effect on the legal rights of those
outside the legislature, passage of a concurrent resolution under the Act would not alter the
President's right to wage war because, from this vantage, the President possesses no war
power that a resolution could alter.").
122. John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1379, 1386 (1988).
123. See Biden & Ritch, supra note 18, at 386; see also Ely, supra note 122, at 1393.
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attack but Congress has not given him authorization.124 Section
5(c) has also been criticized, as ambiguities in the text create sig-
nificant doubt over when the sixty-day clock is triggered, 115 and it is
doubtful Congress would even invoke the time limit, thereby just
providing an excuse for the president not to abide by the War Pow-
ers Resolution altogether.1 26 The sixty-day time limit is also
problematic, as it may provide the enemy with incentive to hold on
and escalate hostilities to increase U.S. casualties. 17 It is also argu-
able that the sixty-day time period, with its thirty-day extension, is
an indefensibly long time to have troops in the field without con-
1281gressional authorization.
3. Presidents Disregard the Resolution
Perhaps the most significant problem facing the War Powers
Resolution is presidential disregard. Shortly after the 1973 passage
of the War Powers Resolution, on May 12, 1975, Cambodians
seized the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez.129 In response, President
Ford ordered air strikes against Koh Tang Island where the crew
was thought to be held and sent in the Marines, but he delayed
exercise of his War Powers Resolution Section 4(a) (1) obligation
to inform Congress until after the operation was over, thereby de-
nying the Resolution any practical effect. 3  President Ford,
ordering the operation "pursuant to the President's constitutional
Executive power and his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Armed Forces," thus engaged in a hostile action
overseas in which forty-one U.S. troops were lost without regard to
the War Powers Resolution.1 '3 Similarly, President Carter did not
consult Congress prior to the 1980 Desert One rescue effort de-
signed to free American hostages in Tehran.
1
3
2
When President Reagan deployed troops to Lebanon in 1982,
he neglected to report the action to Congress under Section
4(a) (1). Although Congress considered invoking the War Powers
Resolution, popular sentiment of support discouraged such
124. See Biden & Ritch, supra note 18, at 386.
125. See id. at 389-90.
126. See Ely, supra note 122, at 1397.
127. SeeTURNER, supra note 89, at 148.
128. See Ely, supra note 122, at 1398.
129. See Vance, supra note 28, at 88.
130. SeeFISHER, supra note 18, at 137; see also TURNER, supra note 89, at 121.
131. IRONS, supra note 18, at 199.
132. See FISHER, supra note 18, at 139; see also IRONS, supra note 18, at 200; TURNER, Su-
pra note 89, at 123.
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efforts. 33 Instead, Congress acted to save face, passing separate leg-
islation providing that Section 4(a) (1) became operative and
permitting the military action for eighteen months.1
34
The deployment to Lebanon was not President Reagan's only
violation of the War Powers Resolution. Reagan repeatedly sent
troops overseas without consulting Congress, thereby violating the
War Powers Resolution: on October 25, 1983, sending American
troops to invade the Caribbean nation of Grenada; 13 5 on March 24,
1986 launching air strikes against Libya;' 36 and in 1987, authorizing
escort operations in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War.
37
President George H.W. Bush followed his predecessor's example,
invading Panama in Operation Just Cause in December 1989 with-
out congressional consultation. 38 The same for President Clinton
who failed to consult Congress prior to his launching of missiles
against Baghdad in June 1993' 39 or his 1999 bombing campaign
against Serbia.4 0 Thus, over the War Powers Resolution's thirty-five
year history, Presidents of the United States have routinely ignored
or disregarded the War Powers Resolution.
While Congress has attempted to engage in self-help in an effort
to restore its constitutionally granted war power, its efforts have
largely failed. Early attempts were either ignored or withdrawn and
Congress's most concerted effort-the War Powers Resolution of
1973-suffers from the pitfalls of questionable constitutionality,
inartful drafting, and presidential disregard. As the law currently
stands, presidents consistently engage in military conflict without
congressional input, and Congress is without real legal recourse in
reasserting its constitutional prerogative in war-making decisions.
Accordingly, a new legal regime is necessary.
133. See Carter, supra note 77, at 106.
134. See FISHER, supra note 18, at 140; see also Carter, supra note 77, at 105; FISHER, supra
note 37, at 68; IRONS, supra note 18, at 201.
135. See IRONS, supra note 18, at 202; see also FISHER, supra note 37, at 68-69; FISHER, SU-
pra note 18, at 141-42; TURNER, supra note 89, at 123-25; Vance, supra note 28, at 89-90.
136. See FISHER, supra note 18, at 142-44; see also FISHER, supra note 37, at 69-70.
137. See Biden & Ritch, supra note 18, at 368-69; see also FISHER, supra note 18, at 144-
45.
138. SeeFISHER, supra note 18, at 145-48; see also IRONS, supra note 18, at 203-04.
139. SeeFISHER, supra note 18, at 151-52.
140. See HEALY, supra note 59, at 126.
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V. ONCE MORE UNTO THE BREACH: THE WAR POWERS
APPROPRIATIONS ACT
While the constitutional Framers intended Congress to play an
integral, if not dominant, role in deciding when to go to war,
presidents have expropriated the war power to the point that a
Chief Executive can go to war without consulting Congress. The
courts have been of little assistance in providing a remedy, and
Congress's self-help efforts have been unsuccessful. As such, the
present task is to design a means for reforming war power in such a
way that Congress's role cannot be sidelined. Since the executive
branch cannot be trusted to willfully relinquish power and the ju-
dicial branch has elected not to address the issue, the legislative
branch must engage in some form of self-help. However, in order
for Congress to succeed, this self-help must avoid previous legisla-
tion's shortcomings of questionable constitutionality, inartful
drafting, and presidential disregard. To accomplish these objec-
tives, Congress should pass the War Powers Appropriations Act, a
hypothetical piece of legislation developed below that re-injects the
legislature in the war-making discussion.
The War Powers Appropriations Act will rest upon Congress's
constitutional power to appropriate funds. The Act will ensure
congressional input in both the decision to engage in armed con-
flict as well as to maintain conflict. Furthermore, because the
president will require Congress's continued funding to pursue mili-
tary conflict, the Executive will be largely unable to disregard the
Act's provisions.
The proposed language of the Act is as follows:
Section 1. None of the funds appropriated by Congress shall
be used for overseas combat unauthorized by Congress, ex-
cepting missions to rescue American hostages and missions to
thwart imminent attack upon the American homeland or
American troops stationed abroad.
Section 2. If, in the judgment of Congress, the United States is
engaged in overseas military action, each House of Congress
will hold a vote every sixty days following the date of initial
engagement assessing the sense of Congress as to whether the
war should be continued. If, in any one of these votes, a two-
thirds supermajority in each House of Congress votes not to
sustain continued military action, the Congress shall notify
the president. Ninety days following both Houses' passage of a
measure not to sustain continued military action, an appro-
[VOL. 43:3
Once More Unto the Breach
priations limitation rider will take effect, specifying that none
of the funds appropriated by Congress may be employed to
pursue further hostile action. The ninety day time frame for
the implementation of this appropriations limitation rider
can be extended via majority vote in each House of Congress.
Section 3. The term "funds appropriated by Congress" shall
include all amounts Congress has disbursed or will disburse
including, but not limited to, previously passed annual ap-
propriations, supplemental appropriations, continuing
resolutions, and direct spending. The term "imminent attack"
shall be defined as a hostile military action capable of being
waged within one week.
A. Congress Has Authority to Control Appropriations to
Affect American Military Forces
The power to appropriate money, known colloquially as the
"power of the purse," lies firmly within Congress's realm of consti-
tutional authority. Under Article I of the Constitution, Congress's
enumerated powers include the ability to collect taxes, borrow
money, and authorize expenditures. 4' Furthermore, Section 9 of
Article I explicitly limits the executive branch's power to spend
money to only those purposes and amounts Congress specifies:
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law .... 4 During the Constitution's
ratification, Congress's power of the purse was cited as a significant
check on the president's power. In FEDERALIST No. 48, James
Madison noted that "the legislative department alone has access to
the pockets of the people."'43 Additionally, in FEDERALIST No. 58,
Madison also argued that Congress's "power over the purse may, in
fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with
which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of
the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for car-
rying into effect every just and salutary measure."'"
The judiciary has largely defended this congressional preroga-
tive. An 1880 U.S. Court of Claims decision noted that, "[tihe
absolute control of the moneys of the United States is in Congress,
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-2.
142. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, c. 7.
143. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
144. THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (James Madison).
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and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great power only
to the people." 45 A 1945 California federal district court stated:
"The purpose of the appropriations, the terms and conditions un-
der which said appropriations were made, is a matter solely in the
hands of Congress and it is the plain and explicit duty of the ex-
ecutive branch of government to comply with the same." 46 While
the courts have upheld Congress as the sole power to appropriate
funds, the judiciary has also defended the president's authority as
Commander-in-Chief.
In Fleming v. Page, the Supreme Court held that the president "is
authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military
forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the
manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and
subdue the enemy.' 47 Although such an opinion may initially ap-
pear to thwart any effort to limit the president's war power, the
phrase "placed by law" implies that Congress can constitutionally
limit the scope of the Commander-in-Chief powers.1 48 Thus, it ap-
pears Congress's authority as sole appropriator of funds is a firm
constitutional foundation upon which to construct a legislative
provision to reform the balance of war power.
The notion of Congress utilizing its control over appropriations
to affect the deployment of American military forces is not without
precedent. On multiple occasions over the last thirty-five years,
Congress has used its spending power to limit U.S. involvement in
overseas conflicts. In 1976, Senator Dick Clark of Iowa added the
Clark Amendment to the U.S. Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
prohibiting aid to private groups engaged in military operations in
Angola. 49 Similarly, in 1984, Congress enacted the Boland
Amendment to prohibit U.S. military and intelligence forces from
supporting the Nicaraguan Contras. 5° The Boland Amendment is a
particularly relevant example because it employs an appropriations
limitation rider, the same mechanism underlying the proposed
War Powers Appropriations Act. The relevant text of the 1984
Boland Amendment reads as follows:
145. Hart's Administrator v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1880), affd, 118 U.S. 62
(1886).
146. Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. 985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945), affd, 154
F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1946).
147. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850).
148. See FISHER, supra note 18, at 200.
149. Clark Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 404, 90 Stat. 757 (1976); seeFiSHER, Supra
note 37, at 110.
150. SeeFiSHER, supra note 18, at 176-77.
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During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central In-
telligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other
agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence
activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or
which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indi-
rectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any
nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.
1
1
The Clark Amendment and the Boland Amendment serve as
precedent in support of Section 1 of the War Powers Appropria-
tions Act. Precedent for Section 2 of the Act can be found in the
1973 Case-Church Amendment.52 The Amendment allowed bomb-
ing in Cambodia to continue until August 15, 1973, but prohibited
the use of military forces in Southeast Asia without congressional
authorization. 153 By refusing to provide the necessary emergency
funds, Congress starved the Vietnam War to its death in 1974.154
These three amendments suggests that use of appropriations limi-
tation riders represents a viable means by which Congress can
police presidential use of the war power.
B. The War Powers Appropriations Act Provides for Congressional
Involvement at the Outset and During Armed Conflicts
Ensuring congressional input in war-making decisions is a two-
headed problem. First, Congress-with small exceptions-needs to
be involved in the decision to embark upon an overseas conflict.
However, this only addresses half the problem, for once Congress
authorizes a military action, they still need to be kept in the loop.
The Vietnam War-where a 1964 congressional resolution author-
izing force maintained a conflict lasting through 1975, despite its
repeal in 1971--demonstrates how Congress might initially author-
ize the use of military force, only to have misgivings later on
without any means of again becoming involved in the war-making
decision process. Reforming legislation must create a method by
which Congress can remain involved in the decision to continue or
discontinue hostilities. The War Powers Appropriations Act, via
judicious use of Congress's appropriations power, meets both of
these objectives, providing for both congressional input at the
151. Boland Amendment, Pub. L. 98-473, § 8066(a), 98 Stat. 1937 (1984).
152. STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 656 (1983).
153. Id.
154. ROGER H. DAVIDSON, WALTERJ. OLESZEK, & FRANCES E. LEE, CONGRESS AND ITS
MEMBERS 459-60 (11th ed. 2008).
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outset of an overseas conflict, as well as consistent congressional
input as the president pursues a war.
The War Powers Appropriations Act accomplishes its objectives
of ensuring congressional input both at the outset of overseas con-
flict as well as during the pursuit of a war via blanket application of
an appropriations limitation rider.155 Limitation riders are provi-
sions in appropriations bills that prohibit the spending of funds for
specific purposes. They are generally phrased in the form of:
"None of the funds provided in this Act shall be used for .... "
Limitation riders are a common means by which Members of Con-
gress seek to insert policy proposals into appropriations
legislation. 156 Section 1 of the Act is worded to require Congress's
approval to go to war in almost all circumstances, with exceptions
being narrowly confined to hostage rescue missions and missions
defending American soil or soldiers from imminent attack. The
provision dovetails with the Framers' intent that the president is
permitted to "repel sudden attacks"' 57 without congressional au-
thorization, while the initiation of other types of military action
can be done only with congressional approval.
When the United States is at war, Congress remains a key player,
reviewing the merits of the conflict every sixty days, regardless of
whether Congress initially authorized hostilities. If the war is sup-
ported, military action is confirmed and the conflict continues.
However, if public sentiment turns against the conflict, Congress
retains the ability to put a stop to the conflict, giving the president
a ninety day window to safely extricate American troops from the
region. By forcing these votes every sixty days, the Act ensures that
the president is apprised of Congress's position, which is recorded
in both remarks on the floor as well as the final outcome of the
vote. Thus, the effect of Section 2 is not to co-opt the Commander-
in-Chief's role in directing the armed forces, but rather to keep the
president informed of the sense of Congress and, if necessary, to
force the president to devise a scheme under which American
troops can be withdrawn. If a supermajority turns against the war,
the president is afforded a three-month cushion to effectuate a
withdrawal plan, thereby granting the president enough time to
plan and manage the safest possible extraction. If it becomes
155. "None of the funds appropriated by Congress shall be used for overseas combat
unauthorized by Congress, excepting missions to rescue American hostages and missions to
thwart imminent attack upon the American homeland or American troops stationed
abroad." Proposed WVar Powers Appropriation Act, § 1; see supra Part V for full text of pro-
posed act.
156. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 53
(7th ed. 2007).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
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apparent that ninety days is an insufficient amount of time, if the
situation on the ground dramatically changes, or if the president
believes more time is necessary to safely effectuate a withdrawal
plan, Congress retains the power to delay the effective date of the
appropriations rider.
C. Potential Arguments Against the War Powers
Appropriations Act Fall Short
It is unlikely that the War Powers Appropriations Act will be wel-
comed without controversy. There are several likely
counterarguments to the Act's implementation, including: (1)
Congress lacks the backbone necessary to pass the Act, or to im-
plement its provisions; (2) Section 2 of the Act amounts to an
abandoning of U.S. troops in the field of battle; (3) the Act's provi-
sions represent an unconstitutional infringement upon the
president's power as Commander-in-Chief.
1. Congress Has Previously Shown Strength
in Claiming War Power
The first counterargument represents a valid concern: after all,
Members of Congress are constantly "running scared," spending
much of their time fundraising and campaigning for re-election. 58
Why would Congress want to thrust its hand into a potential hor-
net's nest, when it is usually presidents whose names get tarnished
when wars go badly? It is worth noting, however, that when wars
have become sufficiently unpopular, Congress has had occasion to
assert its opposition. In 1971, as the Vietnam War dragged on and
the war's popularity plummeted following its expansion into Cam-
bodia, Congress acted to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that
initially authorized the war.19 Following that repeal, Members of
Congress launched a myriad of lawsuits, seeking a court's ruling
that the Vietnam War was unconstitutional, as the president lacked
the necessary congressional authority.'60 In a second example, dur-
ing the 1998 bombing campaign over Kosovo, Members of
Congress openly challenged President Clinton, noting that the
158. See generally ANTHONY KING, RUNNING SCARED: WHY AMERICA'S POLITICIANS CAM-
PAIGN Too MUCH AND GOVERN Too LITrLE (1997).
159. Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat.
2053, 55 (1971).
160. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1221.
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bombing campaign was waged without congressional authorization
and would represent a violation of the War Powers Resolution if it
continued. 6' Most recently, when Democrats retook control of
Congress in the 2006 elections, they sought to use spending bills to
express their opposition to continuing the Iraq War.162 These ex-
amples from the past thirty-five years demonstrate a congressional
willingness to challenge executive war power.
2. The Act Does Not Abandon Troops on the Field of Battle
A second counterargument to the War Powers Appropriations
Act is that it represents a measure abandoning American troops on
the battlefield. The arguments leveled against opponents of the
$87 billion Iraq War supplemental appropriations bill passed by
Congress in November 2003 represent a taste of what critics might
argue in evaluating the War Powers Appropriations Act. 63 Section 1
of the proposed Act is largely immune from this "abandoning the
troops"-type criticism, as that Section's function is to keep troops out
of unauthorized combat. Section 2, however, is more vulnerable.
But Section 2 does not provide an immediate appropriations
cutoff, which would strand troops on the field of battle. To the
contrary, Section 2 places the onus on the president who, as Com-
mander-in-Chief and recipient of intelligence and military reports,
is the appropriate entity for planning the troops' safe extraction. If
in the president's judgment a safe withdrawal requires additional
time, he can take his case to Congress and obtain an extension.
The provision also affords Congress the ability to react to a
changing situation on the ground or a shift in public attitude. By
requiring a supermajority in both House and Senate, the bar for
triggering the ninety day withdrawal window is sufficiently high to
ensure that a vote to discontinue the conflict is a belief broadly
held amongst Members of Congress and the American people.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Congress's decision to end the war
will be a surprise. By recording votes every sixty days, the president
will be aware of Congress's increasing sentiment concerning the
untenable nature of a given tactic or situation on the ground.
161. See Alison Mitchell, Only Congress Can Declare War. Really. It's True., N.Y. TIMES, May
2, 1999, at WK6.
162. SeeDAVIDSON, OLESZEK & LEE, supra note 154, at 460.
163. David Firestone, Democrats Lean Against Bush Spending Request, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2003, at A10 ("Many conservative Democrats say they would readily vote against the recon-
struction aid if it were a separate bill, but feel obliged to vote for the entire package in order
to avoid being charged by Republicans with abandoning the troops.").
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Using Congress's appropriations power to limit the president's
ability to unilaterally make war always carries the risk that critics
will decry such efforts as "cutting off the troops." However, the
procedural safeguards inherent in the War Powers Appropriations
Act likely serve to assuage such concerns.
3. The Act Represents a Constitutional Exercise
of Congress's Authority
A third potential argument against the proposed legislation is
that it represents an unconstitutional usurpation of the president's
power as Commander-in-Chief. In confronting this argument, it
should be noted that the previous cited precedents-the Clark
Amendment, Boland Amendment, and Case-Church Amend-
ment-were never held unconstitutional by any court.
Furthermore, from an originalist perspective, the War Powers Ap-
propriations Act does not interfere with the president's
constitutionally afforded powers. As cited previously, Alexander
Hamilton in FEDERALIST No. 69 noted that the president's Com-
mander-in-Chief power amounted to "nothing more than the
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces,
as first General and admiral of the Confederacy.... "164 Hamilton
goes on to describe how the duties of declaring war and raising
and regulating fleets and armies are under Congress's control.
165
The proposed legislation does not govern the mechanics of troop
deployment and withdrawal, instead leaving these responsibilities
to the Commander-in-Chief. The Act's only function is to set the
rules under which Congress will exercise its Article I, Section 9
power to appropriate funds. While constitutional objections
plagued the War Powers Resolution following the 1983 Chadha de-
cision, the War Powers Appropriations Act avoids enacting a
legislative veto provision. Because the legislation is couched within
Congress's Article I, Section 9 power of the purse, it represents a
constitutionally viable means for Congress to engage itself in the
decision to make war.
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
165. Id.
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D. A Hypothetical Application of the War Powers Appropriations
Act to Past Conflicts Reveals its Efficacy
While in theory, the War Powers Appropriations Act may repre-
sent a viable means for Congress to reassert its constitutional war
power, it must be recognized that war-making decisions are in-
tensely political affairs. Accordingly, in order to probe the
potential efficacy of the proposed legislation, it may be helpful to
apply legal formalism to political history, hypothetically applying
the War Powers Appropriations Act to recent controversial conflicts
to see what effect the Act's provisions might have had. Looking
back over the past thirty-five years, it is likely that the War Powers
Appropriations Act would have prevented several wars from occur-
ring, or at least forced the president to obtain congressional
authorization before deploying troops. Section 1 of the War Powers
Appropriations Act would have forced Congress to authorize or
would have otherwise prevented President Reagan's military excur-
sions into Lebanon, Libya, and Grenada, President Bush's invasion
of Panama in 1989, and President Clinton's bombing campaign
over Serbia in 1998.
During the congressionally authorized conflicts of Vietnam or
the current Iraq War, for example, Congress would have been re-
quired to hold bimonthly votes assaying congressional support for
the conflict. While counterfactual history is always difficult, it is
arguable that bimonthly votes regarding Vietnam may have af-
fected the course of the war. Perhaps in 1970, as public support for
the war dwindled in the aftermath of the 1968 Tet Offensive, bi-
monthly congressional votes and the realistic possibility that
Congress might end the war may have given President Nixon pause
before he expanded combat operations to Cambodia.
The course of the current Iraq War might also have been influ-
enced had the War Powers Appropriations Act been in effect.
While it may be unlikely that Congress could muster the superma-
jority necessary to end the conflict, Congress's realistic ability to
trigger that ninety-day withdrawal window might have provided
President George W. Bush with increased incentive to provide
more swiftly a strategic plan describing American objectives and an
exit strategy. While these counterfactual scenarios are nothing but
conjecture, the fact remains that had the War Powers Appropria-
tions Act existed at the time of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, it would
have been impossible for Congress to pass a resolution authorizing
force and then be largely sidelined for years as the war dragged on.
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Consistent with the Framers' intentions, Congress would have
played a more active role.
In the end, the War Powers Appropriations Act may not be the
most elegant legislative solution to the problem. Denying life to a
war or threatening to kill one by cutting off its food supply of con-
gressionally appropriated dollars is a somewhat crude legislative
mechanism. The Act attempts to mitigate its harshness by provid-
ing means by which the president can still repel sudden attacks and
providing for possible extension of the deadline triggering the
three-month withdrawal window. With these structural safeguards
in place, the War Powers Appropriations Act seems to represent a
viable means by which Congress can once again become an inte-
gral player when the United States makes war. The proposed Act
represents an improvement over the current regime in which a
president can unilaterally initiate sustained military conflict with-
out the consent of the people's representatives in Congress. With
the courts and Congress's previous efforts failing to bring about
the balance the Framers envisioned, the United States needs the
War Powers Appropriations Act.
CONCLUSION
The present conflict in Iraq, just like the Vietnam War thirty-five
years ago, marks an interesting constitutional moment, whereby
the appropriate balance of war power between the legislative and
executive branches is being hotly debated. Much of the contention
regarding the proper balance of war power between Congress and
the president stems from the Framers' bifurcation of war making
authority in the United States Constitution. While Congress's
enumerated powers include the power to declare war, raise and
support armies, provide and maintain a navy, make rules for the
government of military forces, lay taxes, and appropriate funds, the
president is explicitly afforded the power to act as Commander-in-
Chief, make treaties, and appoint envoys with the Senate's consent.
Scholars have meticulously deconstructed the debate regarding
war power at the Philadelphia Convention, noting how delegates'
remarks during the "make war" debate suggest that the Framers
intended Congress, and not the president, to decide when the
United States would wage war. Other structural elements in the
Constitution include Congress's power to issue letters of marque
and reprisal. Evidence from the ratification, as expressed in the
Federalist Papers, affirms this notion that the Framers intended
Congress to reign supreme in making the decision to make war.
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A historical survey, however, imparts an image of the president
expropriating Congress's war power over the United States' two-
hundred twenty years of existence. Early uses of military power-
including the Quasi-War with France, the Barbary Wars, and the
War of 1812-illustrate presidential deference to Congress. The
launch of the Korean War in 1950, however, marked the end of
Congress's dominant role, when President Truman relied on a UN
resolution, rather than the U.S. Congress, to justify the use of
force. Since 1950, American presidents have routinely engaged in
unauthorized overseas military combat across the globe in the Car-
ibbean, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Thus,
under the current system, the United States can go to war solely on
the president's order, a situation remarkably different from the
one the Framers envisioned.
The judiciary has proven to be an ineffective means for uphold-
ing Congress's role in the decision to wage war. While early
Supreme Court decisions recognize the breadth of Congress's war
power, subsequent decisions-namely The Prize Cases and United
States v. Curtiss-Wright-have seemed to condone the president's
predominance in the realm of war and foreign affairs. Most re-
cently, the courts have shied away from rendering decisions
regarding the constitutionality of war making decisions, instead
declaring such cases to be non-justiciable on account of the politi-
cal question doctrine, mootness, ripeness, or a lack of standing.
With the courts rendering little assistance, Congress has engaged
in self-help, promulgating legislation to restore their war making
prerogative. These efforts, however, have proven unsuccessful with
the War Powers Resolution of 1973-by far the most notable of
Congress's efforts-suffering from the ailments of constitutional
questionability, inartful drafting, and presidential disregard.
Accordingly, this Note advocates that Congress embark on a sec-
ond legislative effort to ensure that its input is considered when
the United States wages war. The proposal, entitled the War Powers
Appropriations Act, calls for using Congress's power to appropriate
funds as a means for curbing the president's power to unilaterally
make war. While one section of the Act requires congressional au-
thorization prior to engagement in most hostilities, a second
section keeps Congress in the loop as the war continues with Con-
gress maintaining the ability to end the war should broad
consensus turn against the conflict. Various safeguards in the legis-
lation ensure that the president is still able to repel sudden attacks
and that the troops are not abandoned in the battlefield. Although
counterfactual history is always difficult, conjecture regarding how
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the War Powers Appropriations Act might have affected controver-
sial conflicts over the past thirty-five years suggests how the Act
might have curbed the executive's current unilateral ability to ini-
tiate and prosecute the Nation's wars.
Among the various decisions a nation makes, committing sol-
diers to the battlefield is the most important. To permit this heavy
responsibility to fall in the hands of one leader is antithetical to the
republican principles upon which the United States Constitution
rests. Congress, by entering once more unto the breach and devel-
oping a second legislative proposal to ensure congressional input
in war-making decisions, can bring America closer to her founding
principles. The War Powers Appropriations Act represents one
proposal Congress might entertain to reassert its war-making pre-
rogative and bring contemporary America a step closer to the
more perfect union the Framers designed.

